========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980105.021515.480@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 5 Jan 1998 07:15:15 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted: >From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com >Message-ID: <19971231.181840.382@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> >>>richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >>>Your conclusion only follows from the assumptions if you assume that >>>our estimations of social cost should be calculated as some multiplicative >>>or additive relation of probability of harm and amount of harm. I can >>>easily imagine other functions... >> >> Normally cost (technically utility) functions are required to >>have the property that the utility of an uncertain outcome is the >>expected utility. Under certain plausible assumptions any reasonable >>utility function can be rescaled to have this property. >> Consider Puchalsky's cost function. He assigns an infinite >>cost to the destruction of humanity but a finite cost to a .01% chance >>of humanity's destruction. This suggests we measure costs in units >>of probability of complete human destruction. >>... >>and measure all costs in P's instead of $. Perhaps a typical human >>death would represent a cost of about 10**6 P's. Of course by >>definition human extinction would have a cost of 10**16 P's. Would >>this make Puchalsky happier? > >You realize, of course, that you've put forth an argument that infinity >equals a finite number. If you look at your argument above, you start >with the assumption that human destruction has an infinite cost and end >with the conclusion that it equals 10**16 P's. Therefore the P must >be infinite, in which case it makes no sense to talk about 10**16 of them >in contrast to some other number. I'm sure you can find the problem if you >look for it, it's in the sentence about a finite cost for a .01% chance >of destruction. If you assume that, you're assuming the conclusion. >But that assumption is incompatible with one of infinite cost for >certain destruction and one that the utility of an uncertain outcome >must be the expected utility. No, I am not arguing that infinity equals a finite number. I am arguing that a cost function that ranges from 0 to infinity can be rescaled to one that ranges from 0 to 1. What is the essential property of a cost function? It is that if you prefer outcome X to outcome Y then the cost you assign to X should be less than the cost you assign to Y. Since only the order matters any order preserving transformation applied to the cost function will give one with the same property. (This is similar to but more general than changing units from dollars to cents or German marks.) So consider Puchalsky's cost function p which assigns costs ranging from 0 (for no change) to infinity (immediate destruction of humanity). We may define a new cost function q so that for any outcome V, q(V) = p(V)/(p(V)+1). Now it is easy to verify that if p(V1) < p(V2) then q(v1) < q(v2). So the cost functions p and q correspond to the same set of preferences about outcomes. But the new cost function q assigns costs ranging from 0 (no change) to 1 (immediate destruction of humanity). So it would appear that Puchalsky's preferences can captured without requiring that the immediate destruction of humanity be assigned an infinite cost. In order to reduce the amount of arbitrariness in cost (utility) functions it is conventionally required that they satisfy a second property, namely the cost of an uncertain outcome be equal to its mathematical expectation. This allows us assign meaning to the statement event X is twice as costly as event Y. It means we are indifferent between Y for sure and a 50% chance of X. Given certain plausible assumptions this can be done and will be unique up to a scaling factor (assuming the status quo is assigned 0). I suggest that Puchalsky's cost function can be transformed to one with this second property as well as follows. Puchalsky has indicated (I believe) that his cost function assigns zero cost to the status quo, large but finite cost to a .0001 chance of human extinction and infinite cost to immediate human extinction. This suggests we can transform Puchalsky's cost function as follows. Consider an event A which Puchalsky assigns a cost of X. We ask Puchalsky what value of p gives the event, B = p chance of human extinction, a cost of X as well. (So that Puchalsky is indifferent between A and B.) We then in our new cost function assign a cost p to those events which in Puchalsky's old cost function had a cost of X. This new function (given certain plausible assumptions about Puchalsky's preferences) will have the desired property while still capturing Puchalsky's preferences. I then suggesting rescaling this function by 10**16 to make the cost of human extinction a large number (10**16) instead of 1. Puchalsky continued: >Utility is rather an artificial concept. What is the purpose of the >exercise? I had the assumption that the purpose was to provide a >mathematical guide for prioritization of social resources that could be spent >on various risks. If that's so, there is no a priori reason why the >guide has to be a well-behaved utility function. No, utility is used much more generally. I think the purpose of utility is to provide a model of "rational" decision making. This then can be compared with how humans actually make decisions. Obviously there are many reasons to study how humans make decisions. There are problems with trying to define an utility function for society as opposed to for an individual. I believe this reflects fundamental problems with democratic decision making (Arrow paradoxes). Puchalsky continued: >I believe that more important principles for the guide should be: > >1) The numbers used do not contradict what we know about physical reality; > i.e. if an event has a probability of 1 in one million according to our > best knowledge, this probability should not be changed to make the numbers > work out in the guide; I agree with this. However it is unclear what "best knowledge" means (ie what probability to use when there is uncertainty about the actual probabilities). Puchalsky continues: >2) The "harm values" of different events should be set according to the > same principles that inform our other (i.e. political and legal) > decision making procedures. Examples: > a) Wholesale destruction of society is not allowable and outweighs any > other imaginable cost. > b) Human lives within society are assumed to have equal value. Here Puchalsky is trying to sneak his personal values into the guide. It is unclear what Puchalsky means by society, I will assume society refers to the United States. I will note: 1) It was the stated policy of the US to initiate nuclear war with the USSR if necessary to prevent a soviet conquest of Europe contrary to Puchalsky's claim 2a above. 2) US tort law assumes lives do not have equal value contrary to Puchalsky's claim 2b above. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980105.135544.713@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 5 Jan 1998 18:55:44 GMT References: <349297EF.5ACF@vision.net.au> <34964e15.0@wltss01.nwl.ac.uk> <68qv1m$sbd@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <68qv1m$sbd@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 5 Jan 1998 15:42:46 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >However, there is yet another error, probably the largest, which you >repeat in another posting, that the final perturbation is likely to >be limited to 2 to 8 times the observed change, corresponding to >an equivalent CO2 doubling. This bit of confusion seems to me very >common and is central to the widespread and in my opinion unjustified >complacency on this issue. > >CO2 equivalent doubling is quite specifically the best case outcome in >the face of rapid declines in greenhouse gas emissions. The range of >2 to 8 times the observed perturbation therefore requires constraints >on emissions far more vigorous than those purportedly (but more as a >gesture than a real commitment) agreed to at Rio and Kyoto. Suppose we assume (as I think likely) that CO2 emissions will continue at, at least the current rate, until fossil fuel reserves are physically exhausted. Then what is the expected climate perturbation? Is there any significant dependence on the exact emission scenario? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980106.173543.138@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 6 Jan 1998 22:35:43 GMT References: <349297EF.5ACF@vision.net.au> <34964e15.0@wltss01.nwl.ac.uk> <19980105.135544.713@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <68sdlo$ccv$1@news1.mnsinc.com> In article <68sdlo$ccv$1@news1.mnsinc.com>, on 6 Jan 1998 04:58:32 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com >Message-ID: <19980105.021515.480@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> >>Consider an event A which Puchalsky assigns a cost of X. We ask >>Puchalsky what value of p gives the event, B = p chance of human >>extinction, a cost of X as well. (So that Puchalsky is indifferent >>between A and B.) We then in our new cost function assign a cost p >>to those events which in Puchalsky's old cost function had a cost of >>X. This new function (given certain plausible assumptions about >>Puchalsky's preferences) will have the desired property while still >>capturing Puchalsky's preferences. >> I then suggesting rescaling this function by 10**16 to make >>the cost of human extinction a large number (10**16) instead of 1. > >Let me re-phrase my objection to this mathematical operation in two >different ways. > >1. It's not clear to me that it preserves the most important design >objective, that of assuring that no combination of other costs can add >up to or exceed the cost of certain human destruction. Since all >costly events have an assigned cost X in P units, including those that >have zero chance of causing complete human destruction, it appears possible >that you could add up a number of them to reach 10**16 P. Even events >that each threaten a chance of human destruction shouldn't be able to >add up to the cost of assured human destruction -- if you flip 1 hundred >coins, you would expect to get at least one head, but it still isn't >a certainty. Under this re-mapping, ten very risky costs of 10**15 P >each would add up to the same cost as certain destruction. As I have pointed out before the cost of the event, A and B, is not necessarily equal to the cost of the event A plus the cost of the event B (although this can sometimes be a reasonable approximation) so it is incorrect to talk about adding up costs as Puchalsky does above. As for extreme risks, suppose humanity is playing Russian roulette with a 10 cylinder gun. If we load the gun with ten bullets then the risks of 10**15 P from any particular bullet can in fact be added up to the 10**16 P cost of certain destruction. On the other hand if we load the gun with 1 bullet but play the game 10 times the costs can not be added up to the 10**16 P cost of certain destruction. This is because the cost of losing the game a second time is 0 not 10**16 P. So the cost of the second play is .9*10**15 P since 10% of the time you have already lost and have nothing more to lose. So the cost of committing to play twice is .19*10**16 P consistent with the survival probability of .81. Puchalsky continued: >2. I still don't think the words "cost" and "harm" are being mapped >to "utility" in a way that I agree with. I've been using "harm" to mean >the social value of an actual event -- what I think you mean by "utility". >I've been using "cost" to mean the ranking factor within a cost-benefit >scheme that is generally calculated as a function of both harm and probability >of harm. This is what you generally refer to as "expected utility". I'm >not sure if I agree with that phrasing, because an equation of expected >utility with cost means that you're assuming that a certain mathematical >function should be used, namely that the cost should be the expection >value of the utility. I don't think this should be assumed. What is being assumed are certain plausible assumptions about your preference function (such as if you prefer A to B and B to C then you will prefer A to C). Given these assumptions then an utility function can be defined which preserves the order of your preferences but has the additional property that the utility of an uncertain event is the expected utility. Puchalsky continued in part (still replying to me): >> Puchalsky continues: >>>2) The "harm values" of different events should be set according to the >>> same principles that inform our other (i.e. political and legal) >>> decision making procedures. Examples: >>> a) Wholesale destruction of society is not allowable and outweighs any >>> other imaginable cost. >>> b) Human lives within society are assumed to have equal value. >> >> Here Puchalsky is trying to sneak his personal values into the >>guide. It is unclear what Puchalsky means by society, I will assume >>society refers to the United States. I will note: > >Certainly these reflect my personal values, but I think a good argument >could be made that they are common to Western societies in general. > >> 1) It was the stated policy of the US to initiate nuclear war with >>the USSR if necessary to prevent a soviet conquest of Europe contrary >>to Puchalsky's claim 2a above. > >This was based on the calculation that the threat would make the actuality >of nuclear conflict less likely to occur. But it is probably one of the >best arguments against my position. Actually I think it was based on the calculation that it would make a soviet conquest of Europe less likely, at an acceptable cost in terms of increased risk to the US. The US has had a relatively sheltered existence, however there are numerous examples of other nations which risked catastrophic military defeat for reasons that made sense to them. Puchalsky continued: >> 2) US tort law assumes lives do not have equal value contrary to >>Puchalsky's claim 2b above. > >But tort law is generally for conflicts between individuals or synthetic >individuals. For criminal justice and social policy of government, Western >societies try to preserve a high degree of equality under the law. CBA >calculations of social policy issues by government officials would seem >to fall under this second case. Just because society chooses to define murder to be the same crime independent of the value of the life taken does not mean society considers all lives to be of equal value any more than a definition of auto theft which is independent of the value of the car stolen implies society considers all cars to be of equal value. This is reflected in civil liability laws. As for social policy I expect numerous examples can be found where lives are not treated as having equal value. For example I expect there will be more public money spent on research on a disease which primarily affects people under 20 than on a disease which primarily affects people over 80 (all other things being equal). In any case you said "lives within society" so none of this applies to third world lives. I don't believe it has been the practice of the US government to value the lives of aliens as highly as the lives of citizens. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980106.185800.611@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 6 Jan 1998 23:58:00 GMT References: <349297EF.5ACF@vision.net.au> <34964e15.0@wltss01.nwl.ac.uk> <68qv1m$sbd@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <19980105.135544.713@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <34b1ebb0.15891834@news.datasync.com> In article <34b1ebb0.15891834@news.datasync.com>, on Tue, 06 Jan 1998 09:07:07 GMT, farrar@datasync.com (Paul D. Farrar) writes: >> Suppose we assume (as I think likely) that CO2 emissions will >>continue at, at least the current rate, until fossil fuel reserves are >>physically exhausted. Then what is the expected climate perturbation? >>Is there any significant dependence on the exact emission scenario? >> James B. Shearer > >It makes all the difference in the world, and this is why one needs to >know something of the carbon cycle. I can't really see us doing >anything less than burning all available fossil fuel over the next >1000yr or so. If we do it slowly, at maybe 50-100% of today's rate, we >can gradually cruise up to about 2-3 times the preindustrial level, at >which we will stay, basically forever, at least as far as humanity is >concerned. Agressive sequestration and disequilibration (ie. iron >fertilization, if has an effect) campaigns could lower the level a >bit. One might think that if we ended up, in several hundred years, >at, say, 2X, we would only have to sequester 1X to get back to "Go", >but it doesn't work that way, because the ocean and its sediments are >a buffer, not a consumer (on this time scale); so, if you pull out a >certain amount from the atmosphere, an almost equal amount will pop >back out of the oceanic buffers. > >If we burn it mostly in a few hundred years, we could go through a >transient of, who knows what. 4X? 6X? We've almost certainly missed 2X >already, although we might limit to 3X. The exact burn scenario can >make a big difference, and most of the decisions, if we ever make any >at all, will have to be made over centuries. Think of the >IPCC-Rio-Kyoto -type process lasting for hundreds of years! We don't >want to go through a severe greenhouse transient that would cause some >serious irrevocable negative effect, such as the loss of a large >portion of the West Antarctic ice sheet (which may be inevitable, >anyway), but it is unlikely that we will know that we are causing a >major problem until it is far too late to stop. But on the bright >side, we may never have to worry about another ice age, although the >orbital parameters won't really be favorable for maybe 7000yr, anyway. Is it really obvious that the risk is determined by the maximum CO2 level reached? For example, wouldn't a narrow spike give less integrated forcing (because forcing is logarithmic and removal of CO2 will be faster)? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980106.190600.638@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 00:06:00 GMT References: <349297EF.5ACF@vision.net.au> <34964e15.0@wltss01.nwl.ac.uk> <68sfi8$oj4@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <68sfi8$oj4@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 6 Jan 1998 05:30:48 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >Well, yes. And those places are almost certain to be uninhabited because >they are almost certain to be in the middle of ocean basins. So global >warming of N degrees almost certainly means a mean land surface >warming of 2 N or more - note that the less sensitive ocean dominate >the surface area. Is this really a robust model prediction? Why exactly are the oceans less sensitive? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980107.170910.274@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 22:09:10 GMT References: <349297EF.5ACF@vision.net.au> <34964e15.0@wltss01.nwl.ac.uk> <19980106.185800.611@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <690mqi$kba@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <690mqi$kba@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 7 Jan 1998 19:59:14 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: > >: Is it really obvious that the risk is determined by the >: maximum CO2 level reached? For example, wouldn't a narrow spike >: give less integrated forcing (because forcing is logarithmic and >: removal of CO2 will be faster)? > >A narrow spike is precluded by the chemistry of the situation, at >least barring enormous efforts likely to be considerably more expensive >than refraining form causing the spike in the first place. I meant a narrow spike in emissions. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: crying wolf about global warming From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment,talk.environment,sci.skeptic Message-ID: <19980109.191514.490@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 10 Jan 1998 00:15:14 GMT References: <6945ig$5k5@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <695ffv$lhq$1@news1.mnsinc.com> <695n06$5jv@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <695n06$5jv@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 9 Jan 1998 17:32:53 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >Rich, everyone means well. ... Everyone does not mean well (although they may have deluded themselves into believing that they do). Most people pursue their own interests with little regard for how this may hurt society overall. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980110.000302.376@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 10 Jan 1998 05:03:02 GMT References: <349297EF.5ACF@vision.net.au> <34964e15.0@wltss01.nwl.ac.uk> <19980106.185800.611@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <695hog$mt2$1@news1.mnsinc.com> In article <695hog$mt2$1@news1.mnsinc.com>, on 9 Jan 1998 16:03:28 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes (quoting me): >> As I have pointed out before the cost of the event, A and B, >>is not necessarily equal to the cost of the event A plus the cost of >>the event B (although this can sometimes be a reasonable approximation) >>so it is incorrect to talk about adding up costs as Puchalsky does >>above. > >I must have missed it. ... This is the distinction between linear and nonlinear. A mathematical function is linear if f(a+b)=f(a)+f(b). Puchalsky continued: > ... In that case, I agree that the re-mapping is >feasible in theory. However, it has important drawbacks. The usual >assumption is that costs are independent and additive. If treated >as not additive, the investigator of low probability costs might have >to start figuring out just what the cost of a simultaneous severe global >climate change *and* extremely virulent viral epidemic might be if >they both occured at the same time (just an example). ... This usual assumption is an approximation. In some cases it will lead to inaccurate answers. Computing the right answer for these cases is harder but this is not a reasonable argument for pretending the approximation is valid when it isn't. Consider rare events A and B which occur with probabilities p1 and p2. Suppose A and B occur independently (another approximation which can cause errors). Suppose the cost of A alone is c1, the cost of B alone is c2 and the cost of A and B together is c3. Suppose c3=c1+c2+e (so e is the error made in assuming the costs add). Then the total cost T = p1*(1-p2)*c1 + (1-p1)*p2*c2 + p1*p2*c3 = p1*(1-p2)*c1 + (1-p1)*p2*c2 + p1*p2*(c1+c2+e) = p1*c1 + p2*c2 + p1*p2*e So the error made is p1*p2*e. Since we are assuming p1 and p2 are small this term will be much smaller than the other terms unless e is large compared to c1 and c2. This can only happen when A and B together are much worse than A or B separately. If this is the case the investigator should be considering the combination. (For example if A is the event the plane loses the left engine, B is the event the plane loses the right engine, the plane can probably make a safe landing with one engine out but will probably crash with both engines out then the analyst is required to consider the joint event, A and B, to do a proper job.) Puchalsky continued (in part): >But given that this thread has been going on a long time, I'll accept >Shearer's point about this mathematical re-mapping, since the end >effect is still to make the cost of complete destruction of humanity >greater than any other possible combination of costs. This is given Puchalsky's preferences. If for example the salvation of humanity required the extinction of 99.9% of the earth's other species some might feel it was not worth the cost. Few people find the extinction of humanity appealing. However most (apparently including Puchalsky) would be willing to risk a small chance of humanity's extinction in exchange for some large benefit (or cost avoided). Naturally people may differ about whether any particular such gamble should be undertaken. If for example I think a particular gamble is worthwhile and Puchalsky does not, it seems plausible that either I value human existence less or the benefit more than Puchalsky (assuming we agree on the probabilities). Arbitrarily assigning an infinite value to human existence does not seem helpful in analyzing such differences. Puchalsky continued (in part): >Catastrophic military defeat, while very bad, is not the worst possible >thing that can happen to a society. Some countries have been conquered >by waves of invaders only to absorb each in turn into their own culture. >In the context of arguing about the cost of wiping out humanity, the cost >of military defeat is high but not up in the same range. In human history catastrophic military defeat has often meant the extermination of all males of military age and the enslavement of the remainder of the population. This appears to be in the same range as complete destruction to me. In any case it would appear to qualify as "wholesale destruction of society" the point at issue. Puchalsky continued (in part, quoting me): >> Just because society chooses to define murder to be the same >>crime independent of the value of the life taken does not mean society >>considers all lives to be of equal value any more than a definition of >>auto theft which is independent of the value of the car stolen implies >>society considers all cars to be of equal value. This is reflected >>in civil liability laws. > >Here I think your case is weaker. There are important reasons why Western >societies define the value of life taken to be the same in all criminal >cases. Equality under the law is an important principle for holding >society together. Civil court cases are indeed different, but that's >because the government is not really involved as one of the parties to >the case. First US criminal law does make distinctions among victims. For example the federal government apparently considers the lives of certain federal employees more valuable than the lives of other people (cf the Oklahoma City bomb trials). Second I do not understand the distinction you are trying to draw between criminal and civil cases. The government is extensively involved in civil cases. It makes the laws, compels defendants to appear, judges the cases and enforces the decisions. It is also often one of the parties to the case. Puchalsky continued (in part, quoting me): >> In any case you said "lives within society" so none of this >>applies to third world lives. I don't believe it has been the practice >>of the US government to value the lives of aliens as highly as the >>lives of citizens. > >In the case of global climate change, the IPPC authors were commissioned >by the UN, not by the First World or the US or UK or any other country. >If the US wants to officially devalue the lives of citizens of other >countries, that's a matter that I would certainly argue against as a US >citizen but would be its "right" (de facto, at least) as a country. That >doesn't change intellectual responsibility for fostering this view as >a supposedly impartial expert. I doubt you will find much support (in the US) for your position that the US should (for example) value the lives of enemy soldiers as highly as the lives of American soldiers. As for the UN report, I believe this was a report on the economic effects of global warming. It is a fact that economists do not consider all lives to have the same (economic) value. So your quarrel would appear to be with the entire economics profession rather than a single individual. I don't really see why you are making an issue of this. I am sure you are well aware that third world lives will not be given the same weight as first world lives in this or any other decision the world collectively makes. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980113.205808.091@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 14 Jan 1998 01:58:08 GMT Paul D. Farrar posted: >Did I contradict something? I was only refering to the really long >term. In about 1000yr, the emission scenario won't matter, as far as >the atmospheric levels at that time. The level will be set by (a) the >total amount burned, and (b) the exact amount of CaCO3 in the >accessible bottom sediments right now. Mode changes in the oceanic >circulation and sea level could have a lesser effect. See Archer et >al, 1997, Geophysical Research Letters 24 (4), 405-408, for some >scenarios. The author has put a copy on the Web at > >http://geosci.uchicago.edu/~archer/reprints/reprints.html Does this mean humanity could expedite the removal of CO2 from the atmosphere by dumping CaCO3 in the oceans? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: crying wolf about global warming From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980113.210032.113@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 14 Jan 1998 02:00:32 GMT Michael Tobis posted: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: In article <695n06$5jv@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, >: on 9 Jan 1998 17:32:53 GMT, >: tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >: >Rich, everyone means well. ... > >: Everyone does not mean well (although they may have deluded >: themselves into believing that they do). Most people pursue their >: own interests with little regard for how this may hurt society overall. >: James B. Shearer > >Geez. I stand corrected. > >Is that intended merely as description, or actually as prescription? Description in that this is an aspect of human nature. Prescription in that I believe society should be designed to function well with humans as they actually are. Also I am not enthusiastic about trying to change this aspect of human nature through genetic engineering or otherwise. Michael Tobis continued (in part): >Almost everyone means well. Those who don't mean well are doing a >lousy goddamned job of pursuing their own interests. Many people do not pursue their interests very well. Prisons are full of people who did a particularly poor job of pursuing their interests. This does not mean that people that are more subtle and effective in pursuing their interests mean well. You seem to feel that people oppose taking measures to limit global warming because they have been confused into believing that the scientific case is weak. In fact they denigrate the scientific case because they are unwilling to make sacrifices for the benefit of others. So your fulminations about the poor quality of reporting on scientific controversies bearing on policy issues are misguided. These policy disputes are ultimately about who wins and who loses, not about science. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980113.210314.869@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 14 Jan 1998 02:03:14 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: >In the case of global climate change, the IPPC authors were commissioned >: >by the UN, not by the First World or the US or UK or any other country. >: >If the US wants to officially devalue the lives of citizens of other >: >countries, that's a matter that I would certainly argue against as a US >: >citizen but would be its "right" (de facto, at least) as a country. That >: >doesn't change intellectual responsibility for fostering this view as >: >a supposedly impartial expert. > >: I doubt you will find much support (in the US) for your >: position that the US should (for example) value the lives of enemy >: soldiers as highly as the lives of American soldiers. > >False example, obviously. A decision to go to war with a country >clearly involves devaluing the lives of their citizens. Although >not totally; Western countries have often had war crimes trials. So, you would argue against ever going to war then? War is obviously an extreme example, however I believe the US public expects its leaders to put US interests first in less violent arenas, such as trade negotiations, as well. As for war crimes trials, war crimes trials of enemy soldiers obviously don't count. Strangely enough Western countries have not "often" had war crimes trials of their own soldiers. Rich Puchalsky continued (quoting me): >: As for the UN report, I believe this was a report on the >: economic effects of global warming. It is a fact that economists do >: not consider all lives to have the same (economic) value. So your >: quarrel would appear to be with the entire economics profession >: rather than a single individual. > >An argument ad populum? If everyone is doing it, why does that make >it right that it should be done in this particular case? I've already >discussed why this case differs from many more usual economic situations. >Specifically, in this situation it is mostly First World money that will >have to be spent to solve a problem that the First World created, so >the differences between the economies of the First and Third worlds is >not really relevant. Devaluation of Third World lives does not serve >an economic purpose within the analysis, it merely serves as an excuse >for not addressing the problem; an explicit acknowledgement that the >First World will kill members of the Third World if it is in the First >World's interest. Regarding "argument ad populum", there are two aspects to this. First I believe that different life values is as accepted among economists as global warming is among climatologists. Why should a consensus of economists mean less than a consensus of climatologists? Also demonizing an individual (Steven Schneider for example) for views which are typical of his profession seems a bit unreasonable. Second there is the lesson of the proverb "If you have a hammer everything looks like a nail.". Members of different professions are use to thinking about problems in certain ways. If you ask an evolutionary biologist about troubled marriages he may mention the adaptive value of wife-beating, a prostitute may mention how wives could better please their husbands sexually, a fundamentalist preacher may mention the biblical(?) injunction that wives obey their husbands. If such answers will offend you, you should find someone else to ask. If the UN didn't want third world lives valued less than first world lives, it shouldn't have asked an economist. Rich Puchalsky continued (quoting me): >: I don't really see why you are making an issue of this. I >: am sure you are well aware that third world lives will not be given >: the same weight as first world lives in this or any other decision >: the world collectively makes. > >Now this is rather objectionable. Why should I not say anything because >of realpolitick? The same objection could have been made prior to any >advancement in human rights. Before the cessation of slavery in the U.S., >for example, everyone "knew" that slave lives were not as valuable and >that pragmatically there was no way the Southern states would cripple >their economy by freeing them. The position above is rather a caricature >of Sigurdsson's oft repeated "descriptive, not proscriptive" excuse for >economists' justification of those in power, and illustrates how the >first part of the phrase can quickly change into the other. Certainly >I know that third world lives are not likely to be given as much weight; >does that mean that I should simply keep silent about it? You are of course free to argue as you please. However arguing in this way raises the question "Is limiting global warming the best way (at a given cost) for the first world to help the third world?". I think it clearly is not. For example corruption is a huge problem in the third world. The first world could do much more to discourage third world corruption than it currently does which would benefit the third world greatly at little cost to the first world. Your claim that global warming is a special case is unconvincing to me and suggests to me that your outrage on behalf of the third world is mainly tactical and would be expressed less stridently if the issue were Africans killed by elephants. As for your slavery analogy, how would you characterize a group of Northern textile manufacturers who publicly campaigned against allowing imports of Southern textiles citing terrible slave labor conditions in Southern textile factories while objecting not at all to the importation of Southern cotton? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980116.195543.939@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 17 Jan 1998 00:55:43 GMT Paul D. Farrar posted: >> Does this mean humanity could expedite the removal of CO2 >>from the atmosphere by dumping CaCO3 in the oceans? >> James B. Shearer > >I would not say "expedite the removal." I would say "lower the >ultimate level." The removal that will occur is transfer from the >atmosphere to the main body of the ocean. Adding CaCO3 would not >really speed up this process since the main bottlenecks would only be >slightly affected. I should have mentioned in my earlier posts on this >thread that the process is only weakly affected by atmospheric >concentration, also; so that higher atmospheric pCO2 will not be >absorbed much faster. There is no chemical bar that I know of to >reducing the final levels with CaCO3, though. Just as farmers lime >their fields to reduce acidity, we could lime the oceans to neutralize >dissolved CO2 and pull it in from the air. > > CO2(atmos.) <-> CO2 (dissolved) > CO2(dissolved) <-> H+ + HCO3- > HCO3- <-> H+ + CO3-- > CaCO3 <-> Ca++ + CO3-- > >plus a few others like borate reactions. The ocean likes to keep the >CO2 as mostly HCO3-, so adding (or removing) one endpoint compound >(CaCO3 or CO2(atmos.)) pulls in (or kicks out) the other endpoint >compound. What are the main bottlenecks in moving CO2 from the atmosphere to the oceans? Why doesn't increasing the CO2 level in the atmosphere or adding CaCO3 to the oceans increase the removal rate (much)? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980116.195707.509@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 17 Jan 1998 00:57:07 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: Michael Tobis posted: >: >Is that intended merely as description, or actually as prescription? > >: Description in that this is an aspect of human nature. >: Prescription in that I believe society should be designed >: to function well with humans as they actually are. Also I am not >: enthusiastic about trying to change this aspect of human nature >: through genetic engineering or otherwise. > >This shows sociological ignorance, I beleive. I'm very suspicious >of arguments from "human nature". Western society encourages a >certain kind of self interest; some other societies do not. I don't favor >social engineering to change this, but if someone tried it it would >be easier to change society than to do it genetically. You question that humans (like other animals) tend to favor the interests of themselves and their close kin over unrelated individuals of the same species? Or that this trait is biologically based? As for Western society it is comparatively successful in part because it is able to induce individuals to work cooperatively in large groups for the good of the group as a whole. The ability to cooperate is also an important part of human nature. However it is in tension with the tendency of individuals to "cheat", to contribute less or take more from the group than their "fair" share. Arranging society to encourage cooperation and discourage cheating is tricky. Pretending the impulse to cheat does not exist does not seem likely to be helpful in discussing desirable social structures. Rich Puchalsky continued (quoting me): >: You seem to feel that people oppose taking measures to limit >: global warming because they have been confused into believing that the >: scientific case is weak. In fact they denigrate the scientific case >: because they are unwilling to make sacrifices for the benefit of >: others. > >I'd agree with this, to a large extent. But they have been confused >into thinking that they would have to make larger sacrifices than those >they would actually have to make. They have also been confused into >thinking that they themselves would suffer no cost. Exaggerating costs and minimizing benefits are common negotiating tactics when contributions to a proposed joint effort are being determined. Which is not to deny that people are often fooled into working against their interests. Btw what costs would the average American suffer if nothing is done about global warming? I have a hard time seeing how I would suffer any costs at all. Rich Puchalsky continued (quoting me): >: So your fulminations about the poor quality of reporting on >: scientific controversies bearing on policy issues are misguided. These >: policy disputes are ultimately about who wins and who loses, not about >: science. > >And this is where the limitations of this kind of analysis show themselves. >If policy disputes are only about who wins and who loses, then the study >or practise of policy is simply about power. That assumes that it doesn't >matter in any larger sense who wins and who loses. Even if you take the >view that morality is irrelevant and that might makes right, our >increasing ability to affect our physical environment makes ignoring >science within policy more and more untenable. I am not claiming science is irrelevant to policy, I am claiming that few policy disputes would disappear even if there were complete agreement about scientific issues bearing on them. There has been no real doubt for a long time that cigarette smoking is unhealthy but this has not ended the policy disputes about what if anything to do about it. Also I do not think the quality of reporting on scientific issues is as bad as Tobis claims. It not that hard to find out about scientific issues if you care. The fact that many people do not care is not the fault of journalists. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: crying wolf about global warming From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980116.195938.928@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 17 Jan 1998 00:59:38 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: Regarding "argument ad populum", there are two aspects to >: this. First I believe that different life values is as accepted >: among economists as global warming is among climatologists. Why >: should a consensus of economists mean less than a consensus of >: climatologists? > >The cases are completely different. I'm arguing against differential >life valuation on moral grounds. No such moral issue exists with >regard to the technical aspects of climatology -- there is no moral >value to whether clouds have a net warming or cooling effect, for >instance. Economists can only get away with making a moral decision >of this kind if there is an overriding technical reason, such as the >need to model the difference between two different economies. I've >made an argument that there is no such need in this case. [...] >: Second there is the lesson of the proverb "If you have a >: hammer everything looks like a nail.". Members of different >: professions are use to thinking about problems in certain ways. >... >: you should find someone else to ask. If the UN didn't want third >: world lives valued less than first world lives, it shouldn't have >: asked an economist. > >So who should they have asked to predict the economic consequences of >various scenarios? A fortune teller? If economics is a science, then >its practitioners should not be blindly going on with previous >practice in cases where it does not apply. I think you are being inconsistent here. It is a fact that third world countries are less important to the world economy than first world countries. So the economic consequences of various scenarios depend more on how these scenarios affect first world countries than how they affect third world countries. As soon as you phrase the question as economic consequences you are implicitly giving greater weight to the fate of the rich nations as opposed to the fate of the poor nations. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980119.191139.263@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 00:11:39 GMT Paul D. Farrar posted: >On Sat, 17 Jan 1998 00:55:43 GMT, jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: > >> Paul D. Farrar posted: >.. >>> CO2(atmos.) <-> CO2 (dissolved) >>> CO2(dissolved) <-> H+ + HCO3- >>> HCO3- <-> H+ + CO3-- >>> CaCO3 <-> Ca++ + CO3-- >>> >>>plus a few others like borate reactions. The ocean likes to keep the >>>CO2 as mostly HCO3-, so adding (or removing) one endpoint compound >>>(CaCO3 or CO2(atmos.)) pulls in (or kicks out) the other endpoint >>>compound. >> >> What are the main bottlenecks in moving CO2 from the >>atmosphere to the oceans? Why doesn't increasing the CO2 level in >>the atmosphere or adding CaCO3 to the oceans increase the removal >>rate (much)? >> James B. Shearer > >The big bottleneck is getting CO2 out of the ocean surface layer, >which quickly equilibrates with the atmosphere, but doesn't have much >capacity, into the great body of the ocean. Why doesn't adding CaCO3 to the surface layer increase its capacity for absorbing CO2 thereby increasing the rate at which CO2 is removed from the atmosphere? Farrar continued in part: >On the other hand, the very important mechanism of the biological >pumps isn't concentration-related. Organisms convert CO2 to tissue and >carbonate shells, which sink as carcasses and feces, to be converted >back to CO2 at depth by bacteria (organic) or dissolved (CaCO3). This >process is controlled by nutrient supply to the surface (mainly >phosphate and nitrate, but not by CO2), which is controlled by >circulation. Circulation is only indirectly, and probably weakly, >controlled by CO2 levels. In fact, should any CO2-related climate >changes reduce the upwelling, which supplies nutrients, higher CO2 >would actually reduce the transfer rate. Is the biological pump then a much more important means of removing CO2 from the surface layer of the ocean than mixing processes which would appear to be concentration related? How about speeding up the biological pump by adding phosphate and nitrogen to the ocean surface? What are the numbers for this? How does this differ from adding iron? Why does the iron have to be added indefinitely? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980119.191312.457@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 00:13:12 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: You question that humans (like other animals) tend to favor >: the interests of themselves and their close kin over unrelated >: individuals of the same species? Or that this trait is biologically >: based? > >Humans have more control over their biological predispositions than >nay other animal. The degree of self interest is, like many other >things, susceptible to societal variation. For instance, some societies >caused many of their members to voluntarily particpate in their >ritual human sacrifice. This would appear to be the ultimate >sacrifice of individual in favor of societal interest; nor was the >sacrifice always for a small kinship group. I'm not >arguing for a change in our society; I'm simply pointing out that >arguments that take some common characteristic of Western societies >and claim that this characteristic represents "human nature" are >generally ignorant. Certainly humans can control their biological inclinations to some extent. This does not mean it is reasonable to ignore their biological drives when trying to devise workable societies. As for societies practicing large scale voluntary human sacrifice, I tend to doubt their existence. Can Puchalsky provide some references? As for ignorant arguments, a common ignorant argument is to take some negative characteristic found in Western societies and assert it is unique to Western societies and is unknown in more virtuous societies. To get back to the case at hand, does Puchalsky doubt that humans have a natural inclination to behave selfishly? Puchalsky continued: >: Btw what costs would the average American suffer if nothing >: is done about global warming? I have a hard time seeing how I would >: suffer any costs at all. > >That depends on the degree of warming and the time scale, plus the >degree to which the individual cares about generational issues. Some >people care about their children, while others of more libertarian >disposition happily bequeath them problems they didn't make. I don't >know as much about the issue of costs as a careful re-reading of IPCC >would provide. Well you said people had been confused into believing they themselves would not suffer from global warming. I believe most Americans believe, quite correctly, that global warming is not likely to have a significant impact on their lives. As for generational issues, we also bequeath our children benefits they have not earned. If future generations are going to be better off than we are, why should we make sacrifices for their benefit? As for your crack about libertarians, this is just indicative of your tendency to demonize your opponents (another natural human tendency btw). I doubt you can offer any evidence for your statement. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980119.191549.812@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 00:15:49 GMT Stein Sigurdsson posted: >richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: > > >> Steinn Sigurdsson (steinn@sandy.ast.cam.ac.uk) wrote: >> : Or rather, it appears >> : that in practise people in the "third world" value their own >> : lives less than people in the "first world" value their own lives. > >> Sigurdsson's blather is less and less worth reading, but this gem >> deserves a response. Let's have a little scenario in The World >> According To Sigurdsson. > >The problem is that there is a measure of "value" that >can be actually quantified, this has been done, it is >the source of my statement. Whether Puchalsky feels >this is objectionable is irrelevant to whether it has >some factual basis. To be specific, the conventional >measures used are "willingness to pay" and "willingness >to accept", for them to have any validity as measures >they must overlap and be robust quantitatively, the published >literature indicates that they are. I think I agree with Puchalsky here. It is the case that third world people value their own lives in dollar terms less than first world people value their own lives in dollar terms. This may be what you meant but it is not what you said. I do not think what you said follows, instead it appears likely the main reason for the difference is that third world people value dollars more than first world people (as would be expected from their lesser wealth). If you are arguing above that we may assume a dollar has the same value to a third world person as to a first world person, I believe you are wrong. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: crying wolf about global warming From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980119.191931.462@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 00:19:31 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: I think you are being inconsistent here. It is a fact that >: third world countries are less important to the world economy than >: first world countries. So the economic consequences of various >: scenarios depend more on how these scenarios affect first world >: countries than how they affect third world countries. As soon as >: you phrase the question as economic consequences you are implicitly >: giving greater weight to the fate of the rich nations as opposed >: to the fate of the poor nations. > >I think that this argument by implication is, to use Shearer's word, >a quibble. Economics is about the allocation of scarce resources >within society; I happen to beleive in certain goals for society. >There should be some way of suggesting an allocation scheme that would >bring us closer to any particular set of goals. If the methods used by >the field have achieved totemic status rather than being tools to >a particular end, they should be replaced. What I think is happening >in this case is not that the economists are hidebound traditionalists >as Shearer implies with his "if you have a hammer you see problems >as nails" analogy. The problem is that the economists' moral goals >differ from mine. I would like to see a greater degree of respect >for human rights and justice in international relations, and they would >like to defend the privileges of those currently in power. As I understand it, the economists were not given a set of goals and asked for means of achieving them. Instead they were asked to evaluate the economic effects of doing nothing about global warming. Puchalsky apparently feels that doing nothing about global warming is such an immoral course of action that the economists were morally obligated to invent some imaginary economic ill effects of doing nothing. If Puchalsky wishes to maximize the human population in the year 2100, I am sure economists can suggest means to bring us closer to this goal. I imagine economists as a group (like ecologists or climatologists) do have policy preferences that differ from society as a whole. This will tempt them to slant work bearing on public controversies in favor of their policy preferences. This does not mean the methods of the field are inherently biased. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980120.120527.815@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 17:05:27 GMT References: <19980119.191549.812@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <34C43017.87F85AD5@rockisland.com> In article <34C43017.87F85AD5@rockisland.com>, on Mon, 19 Jan 1998 21:03:20 -0800, "Daniel H. Gottlieb" writes: >I sit in front of my computer reading this message astounded at what I >have read. > >You wrote: "...That third world people value dollars more >than first world people (as would be expected from their lesser >wealth). " > > [lots of outraged blathering deleted] You appear to be reading all sorts of implications into my statement which are not there. Consider what $1000 (or the equivalent in local currency) means to a rich westerner making $100000 a year or to a poor third worldler making the equivalent of a few hundred $ a year. The westerner will be happy to receive a $1000 dollar windfall but it is unlikely to enable him to improve his life significantly. This is not true for the third worldler, the equivalent of a $1000 windfall could easily be a major turning point in his life. It could mean obtaining medical care without which he (or his wife or one of his children) would die. It could mean he could buy a small business which would support him for the rest of his life. Perhaps he could pay off a crippling debt or buy the land he works. It is in this sense that I meant third world people value dollars more than first world people. For these reasons a third worldler will be more willing than a rich westerner to risk his life for $1000. I believe this was the basis of Sigurdsson's statement that third worldlers appear to value their own lives less than first worldlers. A statement which I believe was at best poorly phrased. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: crying wolf about global warming From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980120.133047.330@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 18:30:47 GMT References: <19980116.195938.928@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <69vjf6$nqj$4@mohawk.hwcn.org> <34C426C7.BDB5D501@netcom.com> In article <34C426C7.BDB5D501@netcom.com>, on Mon, 19 Jan 1998 22:23:35 -0600, Gordon@netcom.com writes: >Scott Nudds wrote: >> --- >> "You don't dare say America or Christianity is a better way of living. >> When I said during my presidential bid that I would only bring >> Christians and Jews into the government, I hit a firestorm. 'What do you >> mean?' the media challenged me. 'You're not going to bring atheists into >> the government? How dare you maintain that those who believe the >> Judeo-Christian values are better qualified to govern America than >> Hindus and Muslims?' My simple answer is, 'Yes, they are.'" --Pat >> Robertson, The New World Order, 1991 > >And he is right about the principles under which the USA was founded. > >Gordon. No doubt that is why the founders wrote the following into the constitution (article 6, clause 3): "The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980120.134003.728@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 20 Jan 1998 18:40:03 GMT References: <19980119.191549.812@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> In article , on 20 Jan 1998 15:29:27 +0000, Steinn Sigurdsson writes: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com writes: >> If you are arguing above that we may assume a dollar has >> the same value to a third world person as to a first world person, I >> believe you are wrong. > >I don't argue that a $ has the same value to a (average) "third wordl" >person as a "first world" person. I argue that the existence of $ >is _a_ measure of how to convert between different value schemes. If you mean value in terms of dollars this is reasonable. If you mean value in terms of utility it is not. Steinn Sigurdsson continued: >I strongly object to people who enter a technical discussion >where words in the english language have a restricted meaning >(defined in the literature; in this case the word "value" in >the context of economics and environmental valuations) >and the switch in mid-stride to use the word in a colloquial >sense to score cheap rhetorical points with emotional impact. > >To use the comparison I usually make, Puchalsky's switch on >what is "value" is about as productive as if some physicist >entered every sci.env debate on conservation with the perfectly >accurate observation that there is no need to conserve energy >as it is automatically conserved exactly by all physical processes! >Except that Puchalsky simultaneously uses the switch to attack >me personally, again. Interesting analogy. Of course it looks to me as if you are the one who made the seemingly outrageous statement and then retreated behind a technical meaning of value when challenged. I think value is ambiguous (even technically) and is best qualified to avoid misunderstanding. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980121.134721.794@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 21 Jan 1998 18:47:21 GMT References: <19980119.191139.263@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <34c6af2a.3418257@news.datasync.com> In article <34c6af2a.3418257@news.datasync.com>, on Wed, 21 Jan 1998 08:41:55 GMT, farrar@datasync.com (Paul D. Farrar) writes: >On Tue, 20 Jan 1998 00:11:39 GMT, jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: > >> Paul D. Farrar posted: >... >>>The big bottleneck is getting CO2 out of the ocean surface layer, >>>which quickly equilibrates with the atmosphere, but doesn't have much >>>capacity, into the great body of the ocean. >> >> Why doesn't adding CaCO3 to the surface layer increase its >>capacity for absorbing CO2 thereby increasing the rate at which CO2 >>is removed from the atmosphere? > >That should helpsome, but you can't get that much total CO2 into the >surface layer, relative to the oceans as a whole so the effect will be >relatively small. The best strategy would probably be to send it >direct to deeper water than to increase concentration in the surface >layer and wait for downwelling. There is a limit then to the buffer process so that at some point adding CaC03 no longer allows more C02 to be absorbed? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980129.202204.799@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 30 Jan 1998 01:22:04 GMT References: <349297EF.5ACF@vision.net.au> <34964e15.0@wltss01.nwl.ac.uk> <6aqcnr$lr2@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6aqcnr$lr2@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 29 Jan 1998 17:02:51 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >I don't suppose anyone cares to discuss anything beyond the personalities >of Sigurdsson and Puchalsky? > >I thank Robert for his valiant efforts. Alas, it appears that they >are doomed to utter futility. It appears my reply to Shearer was lost >in the noise. Oh well, I wondered what he would say, but it appears he >has more sense than myself and won't waste the time to plow through this >drivel. I did save a post of yours that I haven't gotten around answering. I must confess I am more motivated to reply to posts which I feel are particularly unreasonable (within limits, I try to avoid arguing with idiots). This seems to be a general phenomena which has the unfortunate effect of encouraging people to make unreasonable posts (since many prefer hostile responses to no response at all). However flattery seems to work also. Michael Tobis posted (quoting me): >: As for Western society it is comparatively successful in part >: because it is able to induce individuals to work cooperatively in >: large groups for the good of the group as a whole. The ability to >: cooperate is also an important part of human nature. However it is >: in tension with the tendency of individuals to "cheat", to contribute >: less or take more from the group than their "fair" share. Arranging >: society to encourage cooperation and discourage cheating is tricky. > >I think the reason I like Shearer's writing more than most people with >strong libertarian tendencies is this acknowledgemnet of "trickiness". >Indeed, that's my view as well. Most libertarians seem to think arranging >the marketplace to encourage sufficient cooperation is trivial. I think this misstates the libertarian position. Libertarians tend to believe (often dogmatically) that society would work better with less government. This does not mean that they believe that arranging for less government (while avoiding anarchy) is trivial. Michael Tobis continued in part (quoting me): >: Exaggerating costs and minimizing benefits are common >: negotiating tactics when contributions to a proposed joint effort are >: being determined. Which is not to deny that people are often fooled >: into working against their interests. >: Btw what costs would the average American suffer if nothing >: is done about global warming? I have a hard time seeing how I would >: suffer any costs at all. > >Did the fires in Indonesia this year cost you anything? Think carefully. I should have said "any predictable and material costs". By this standard I do not see how the fires in Indonesia cost me anything. Michael Tobis continued in part (quoting me): >: I am not claiming science is irrelevant to policy, I am >: claiming that few policy disputes would disappear even if there were >: complete agreement about scientific issues bearing on them. > >I certainly agree here, but I don't see how this reflects on my gripe. >Just because good public information isn't sufficient to obtain a >resolution of a problem doesn't imply it isn't necessary! Well obviously it isn't necessary, the correct decision can be made for some completely fallacious reason. Michael Tobis continued in part (quoting me): >: Also I do not think the quality of reporting on scientific >: issues is as bad as Tobis claims. It not that hard to find out about >: scientific issues if you care. The fact that many people do not care >: is not the fault of journalists. > >There are too many issues for a voter to study them all. We need reliable >filters. The fact that prominent journalists are too lazy to find out >about the facts on which they report is certainly their fault. Their habit >of giving "equal time" to two positions, of which usually zero or at most >one is remotely logically sound, is profoundly regrettable. Still it >is perhaps not as bad as important arms of the financial press in the >greenhouse question treating fringe advocacy publications as science and >science as fringe advocacy. Since we don't have direct democracy there is no need for a voter to have a position on every issue. Any news organization filters the news. People can choose the filters they prefer. I don't see why journalists should be blamed for the fact that many people select filters you feel are unreliable. Attributing the failure of journalists to perform their jobs as you would like to laziness is silly. I doubt journalism attracts lazy people. As for the financial press you will have to be more specific if you want a response from me. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980203.203449.671@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 01:34:49 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted (quoting me): >> As for societies practicing large scale voluntary human >>sacrifice, I tend to doubt their existence. Can Puchalsky provide >>some references? > >Not real ones; I'm not a sociologist and I don't have time to do proper >research. But Aztec culture, for instance, practiced large scale >involuntary human sacrifice. Some component of this was beleived to >be voluntary -- for instance, the winners of the "ball game" would be >sometimes be sacrificed afterwards, and other members of the society >would be sacrificed at ritual intervals. There is reason to beleive >that people in that situation thought their sacrifice was "normal" or >even "desirable" and therefore went willingly, just as in a slightly less >outre case soldiers will go on suicide missions. I don't know whether >this is large scale enough for you. Certainly the large scale involuntary >sacrifice of their neighbors was a major factor in the downfall of the >Aztecs, since their neighbors were eager to join the conquistadors in >attacking them and the conquistors needed native foot soldiers, at least >at the beginning. Puchalsky is correct that the Aztecs (Mexica) practiced large large scale involuntary human sacrifice. I believe he is incorrect that there was any significant voluntary component. Some victims were told that they should feel honored, I doubt they agreed. In any case they did not have any choice in the matter. People being executed in the US generally do not have to be dragged into the execution chamber, this does not mean they are going "willingly". Aztec society in general was very stratified and dominated by a hereditary nobility. Common people were forbidden (on pain of death) from wearing cotton clothes for example. The lower classes were forced to serve the nobility and told this was right and just and the will of the gods (compare the divine right of kings or the mandate of heaven). It was wise for them to appear to accept this. Perhaps some actually believed it. This does not make Aztec society unselfish, anymore than the Old South was unselfish even though some slaves, no doubt, found their situation to be "normal". Puchalsky continued (still quoting me): >> As for generational issues, we also bequeath our children >>benefits they have not earned. If future generations are going to >>be better off than we are, why should we make sacrifices for their >>benefit? > >Are they going to be? If that is assumed a priori, then you have a point. >But can it be assumed a priori? And what if we bequeath them a problem >that would have taken us a very minor effort to solve and them a very >major effort? As far as the US goes, if there is any substantial chance that Americans in 2100 are not going to be considerably wealthier than today, then we must have bigger problems than global warming which we should be worrying about. Obviously sometimes a stitch in time saves nine. If we discount at 3% a year then we should be willing to spend about $1 today to save $20 in 100 years. However I believe reducing CO2 emissions will require a bit more than a minor effort. Puchalsky continued (still quoting me): >> As for your crack about libertarians, this is just indicative >>of your tendency to demonize your opponents (another natural human >>tendency btw). I doubt you can offer any evidence for your >>statement. > >It is a common U.S.-libertarian sentiment on the Net; I'm surprised you >haven't encountered it. If you want to consider the comment unsubstantiated, >please do so; I have no desire to poke around in Libertarian position >papers. Plus I admit that I find it amusing to take an occasional >shot at libertarians, deserved or not. No, I haven't encountered libertarians on the net proclaiming that they don't love their children. As for your amusements, I will just note that a similar attitude towards blacks or Jews would be widely deplored. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Climate Change Accelerating? From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980204.185838.344@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 4 Feb 1998 23:58:38 GMT References: <19980202020301.VAA10029@ladder02.news.aol.com> <6b582d$69g@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <6b5e6d$8i1@phoenix.rsn.hp.com> <6balsr$kul@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6balsr$kul@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 4 Feb 1998 21:17:15 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >It does remain impossible to attribute a particular local change to greenhouse >forcing, even though the global change is observed. This has a remarkable >similarity to the tobacco lawsuits now having a significant effect on the >economic landscape of the US. No heavy smoker succeeded in suing the >tobacco companies for health damages, because it was impossible to prove that >any given person would not have contracted a given health condition in the >absence of smoking. But states have sued for the aggregate effect of tobacco >on their public health budgets and succeeded. Individual tobacco suits generally failed because juries believed the dangers of smoking were well known and were unwilling to award damages to smokers who had voluntarily assumed these risks. Numerous people have received damages in other cases where it is only possible to prove statistical causation. As far as I recall none of the state lawsuits were decided by juries. The tobacco companies settled, possibly because they believed they would not receive fair trials. Are you confident of the ability of all states to fairly try cases, in which they stand to gain billions of dollars, against unpopular defendants? Note Florida, for example, retroactively rewrote its laws to permit such lawsuits. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Environmentalist's vs technology From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment,talk.environment Message-ID: <19980210.192859.788@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 11 Feb 1998 00:28:59 GMT References: <6bl0a0$p4g$1@node17.cwnet.frontiernet.net> <6bq86k$id9@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6bq86k$id9@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 10 Feb 1998 19:01:40 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >I think the fact that vehicles carry around their own power plants >is an example of this. The vast majority of vehicle miles are covered >on roads where it would be feasible to provide externally generated >power. The vehicles could then be substantially lighter, cheaper, >and less dangerous. The current transportation system is thus globally >severely suboptimal. However, for me as an individual to obtain an >externally powered car would only allow me to traverse my driveway, >which would be of little use to me. So I optimize for my own circumstances >by getting a regular car, just like almost everyone else. The global >optimization is very far from the aggregate of the individual optima >which the market creates. This is a crackpot idea which you have posted before. You seem unable to critically evaluate ideas which appeal to your prejudices. You appear as bad is this respect as the dogmatically anti-government libertarians you are always using as strawmen. Just because you would like a system of externally powered personal vehicles to be feasible does not mean that it is. To mention just one problem, a system could handle "the vast majority" of miles driven and still be unacceptably unreliable. Pushing my car 1 mile for every 100 miles driven is not acceptable. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980210.200734.002@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 11 Feb 1998 01:07:34 GMT References: <349297EF.5ACF@vision.net.au> <34CE0D12.DF7A0135@nospam.net> <6algel$pb5@peabody.colorado.edu> <6b4u42$r7e@nnrp1.farm.idt.net> <6b55hf$evk$1@news1.mnsinc.com> <6b5hf2$hpa@nnrp4.farm.idt.net> <6b82l2$bh7$1@news1.mnsinc.com> <6bqc2s$mka$1@news1.mnsinc.com> In article <6bqc2s$mka$1@news1.mnsinc.com>, on 10 Feb 1998 20:07:56 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: > >From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com >Date: 1998/02/04 >Message-ID: <19980203.203449.671@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> >> Puchalsky is correct that the Aztecs (Mexica) practiced large >>large scale involuntary human sacrifice. I believe he is incorrect that >>there was any significant voluntary component. Some victims were told >>that they should feel honored, I doubt they agreed. > >I was struck by my recollection that occasionally members of the upper >class were sacrificed, as well as the winners of the "ball game" (it >was surprising to me that they'd still attempt to win, although I suppose >some of them may have "thrown" games and the like.) But in any case, >to return this to at least minimal sci.env relevance, the reason the whole >thing came up was that you asserted that humans are naturally self-interested. >If I remember correctly, this was in the context of whether moral claims >should influence public policy, or part of a general policy discussion of >the responses to anthropogenic climate change. To avoid a digression into >Aztecs I'm willing to stipulate two things: 1) Western culture has as >one of its characteristics a certain type of self-interest, whether >"natural" or sociological, and 2) this self-interest is not intrinsically >bad (by my value system at least), certainly far preferable to many other >elements of either human nature or nurture. The reason for the digression into Aztecs was your implied claim that self-interest is a characteristic of Western culture as opposed to a characteristic of humanity. I do not find the Aztecs a very convincing example of an unselfish culture to say the least. Rich Puchalsky continued: >Now, if we can agree on those two points, what were you trying to say about >public policy response to climate change? My original post was prompted by some comment of Tobis's along the general lines of "everybody means well". In the context of public policy regarding climate change this basically the opposite of the truth. People do not hire Washington lobbyists to unselfishly promote the interests of society as a whole. This should be recognized and discounted for. To take one example that Tobis refuses to acknowledge, climatologists do have a selfish interest in promoting concern about climate. Rich Puchalsky continued (quoting me): >> As far as the US goes, if there is any substantial chance that >>Americans in 2100 are not going to be considerably wealthier than today, >>then we must have bigger problems than global warming which we should be >>worrying about. > >The chance of an accidental nuclear exchange might be considered substantial, >given uncertainty at the Russian end. But if you assume that we are going >to be richer in 2100 unless something very unusual happens, than it might >make sense to try to eliminate some of the largest risk factors even if >that makes us somehwat less rich. The largest risk factors >are global in scale, potentially powerful in effect, >and poorly understood. Global climate change has to qualify by that measure. The question was is it likely that future generations will be wealthier than we are. I see little reason to believe that the costs to the US of coping with climate change would be significant compared to the economic growth that can be expected over the next hundred years. So any sacrifices we make to prevent climate change will probably be for the benefit of people wealthier than we are. This reduces any moral obligation on our part. As for risk factors, I expect the biggest risk factor to the US is internal political strife. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Environmentalist's vs technology From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment,talk.environment Message-ID: <19980211.195402.010@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 12 Feb 1998 00:54:02 GMT References: <6bl0a0$p4g$1@node17.cwnet.frontiernet.net> <19980210.192859.788@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6bsr99$e20@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6bsr99$e20@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 11 Feb 1998 18:39:37 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: In article <6bq86k$id9@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, >: on 10 Feb 1998 19:01:40 GMT, >: tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >: >I think the fact that vehicles carry around their own power plants >: >is an example of this. The vast majority of vehicle miles are covered >: >on roads where it would be feasible to provide externally generated >: >power. The vehicles could then be substantially lighter, cheaper, >: >and less dangerous. The current transportation system is thus globally >: >severely suboptimal. However, for me as an individual to obtain an >: >externally powered car would only allow me to traverse my driveway, >: >which would be of little use to me. So I optimize for my own circumstances >: >by getting a regular car, just like almost everyone else. The global >: >optimization is very far from the aggregate of the individual optima >: >which the market creates. > >: This is a crackpot idea which you have posted before. You >: seem unable to critically evaluate ideas which appeal to your >: prejudices. You appear as bad is this respect as the dogmatically >: anti-government libertarians you are always using as strawmen. Just >: because you would like a system of externally powered personal >: vehicles to be feasible does not mean that it is. > >I freely acknowledge that the idea is a crackpot idea if intended as >a serious policy proposal. It is intended as a gedanken experiment, to >demonstrate an instance where the global optimum doesn't match the >sum of all the individual optima that the marketplace approaches. The >practical political difficulties are insurmountable. However, I have no >reason to believe that the technical difficulties are severe. I think a somewhat higher standard is desirable. Do you have any good reason for believing the technical problems are not severe? You criticize others for posting ignorant nonsense so why should you be exempt. Michael Tobis continued (quoting me)? >: To mention just one problem, a system could handle "the >: vast majority" of miles driven and still be unacceptably unreliable. >: Pushing my car 1 mile for every 100 miles driven is not acceptable. > >There are two obvious responses to this. Firstly, what proportion of the >cost of existing externally powered electrical vehicles is due to the >power distribution system? It seems to me that this amounts only to >a continuous pair of conductors, which on a per length basis is probably >very much smaller than the cost of the track, rail, or road on which the >vehicle travels. Secondly, consider that at great difficulty, battery >powered vehicles are now available that can travel at highway speeds >for a couple of hours. A backup battery system that can travel a mile >or so without adding greatly to the weight or expense of an electric car >if that is considered necessary. My impractical idea, though, is that >everywhere you now see pavement you would see a power distribution rail. >Only people who habitually travel significant distances on unpaved surfaces >would have a use for an internal combustion vehicle in this scenario. Your idea is in fact impractical since power distribution rails are dangerous and must be isolated from pedestrians whereas most pavement is not. You also ignore power failures, it is unacceptable that vehicles not work during power failures. Michael Tobis continues: >Regarding John's complaint that trolleys weigh about the same as busses, >I am not convinced that this argument scales down to private vehicles. I >believe that a large fraction of the weight of a typical private vehicle is >the power plant, the frame to hold up the power plant, the fuel for >the power plant, and the safety devices to keep the power plant and the >fuel of your or someone else's vehicle from injuring you or your passengers. >Much or most of the fuel is thus devoted to schlepping the engine around, >not the payload. This is probably not true of a bus, so the advantage >of a trolley over a bus is smaller, and the bus is better able to negotiate >the traffic. You are just making this up as you go, so why criticize people for doing the same when discussing the greenhouse effect. Michael Tobis continued: >I am less interested, though, in discussing the technical merits of the >idea. My point is, rather, that no serious study of the idea is likely >to be undertaken. I ask you only to acknowledge that it is intrinsically >possible that this approach could have a substantially smaller aggregate >cost than the present transportation system, and that the free market >will never find such an optimum if it exists. > >The question that libertarians raise is whether the public sector has >any business helping the market perform optimizations that are less >local and more global. If you bear with me long enough to imagine that >transportation costs *might* be drastically reduced using external power, >I am interested in an explanation of how the marketplace could converge >on such an optimum. So why don't you pick a noncontroversial example such as typewriter keyboard layouts. It is generally accepted that the standard layout is not optimal. Using a nutty example like the above just gives weight to the libertarian argument that while government interventions in the market can be beneficial in theory, in practice most governmental interference with markets actually harms society (as your proposal would) and therefore it is sensible to reflexively oppose all governmental interference with markets. Returning to keyboard layouts, note just because better layouts exist does not mean society should adopt one, the transition costs may outweigh the benefits. Society may also fail to make a beneficial move because of inability to negotiate a division of the benefits acceptable to all groups with the power to block the move. More generally society may be unable to decide between rival beneficial moves and end up doing nothing. Note in some sense these negotiation costs are part of the transition costs. Markets can facilitate changes by reducing these negotiation costs. Michael Tobis continued: >I have a similar request with regard to global warming, a separate but hardly >unrelated question. Leaving aside the question of whether the problem is >a delusion or a hoax, I'd ask libertarians to imagine how an unregulated >market ought to deal with such a problem on the *presumption* that the >evidence for it is regarded as solid. I doubt unregulated markets can deal with such problems. A market oriented way to discourage CO2 emissions is a carbon tax. Michael Tobis continued (in part): >Why should one regard the results of an unmanaged marketplace as optimal, >or indeed, even as particularly benign? The idea that everyone looking >out for their own interests sums to a global optimum isn't merely uncertain, >after all. There are trivial counterexamples. The argument is not that markets are perfect, it is that they are not broken enough to risk trying to fix. Some attempted fixes make things worse. Thus the saying "if it ain't broke, don't fix it". James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Environmentalist's vs technology From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment,talk.environment Message-ID: <19980218.203705.988@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 01:37:05 GMT References: <6bl0a0$p4g$1@node17.cwnet.frontiernet.net> <6bq86k$id9@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <6celi4$5do$1@newsy.ifm.liu.se> <6cfo8j$6uc@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6cfo8j$6uc@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 18 Feb 1998 22:44:35 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >I indeed value this illusion. What of it? I evolved in certain circumstances >that make me more comfortable. The towers constitute a real cost to me >when they greatly decrease the availability of locations where I feel >extremely comfortable and happy. No one inquired of me when they began >doing this. Everyone who does not use this technology deserves some >compensation from those who do, and the negotiation was not carried out >in good faith. So if I have aesthetic objections to trees, I deserve some compensation every time someone plants a tree? James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Environmentalist's vs technology From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment,talk.environment Message-ID: <19980219.172316.202@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 19 Feb 1998 22:23:16 GMT References: <6bl0a0$p4g$1@node17.cwnet.frontiernet.net> <19980218.203705.988@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6chqat$igt@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6chqat$igt@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 19 Feb 1998 17:32:13 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: > >: So if I have aesthetic objections to trees, I deserve some >: compensation every time someone plants a tree? > > Nice response. > >Do you actually object to trees? Not in general, however if objections would entitle me to compensation I could no doubt come up with some. I think it is already too easy to extort payoffs with essentially frivolous objections to other people's projects. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980227.194127.468@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 28 Feb 1998 00:41:27 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: The reason for the digression into Aztecs was your implied >: claim that self-interest is a characteristic of Western culture as >: opposed to a characteristic of humanity. I do not find the Aztecs >: a very convincing example of an unselfish culture to say the least. > >Well, you implied more than just that self-interest was a characteristic >of humanity, you seemed to imply that it was an immutable characteristic >of the "human nature" of each individual. This isn't true as individuals >at least occasionally evince unselfish behavior. If you don't prefer >Aztec sacrifice as an example, I'm sure that you can find many more >among more current religions and among secular people in general. I >don't think that you convincingly say in every occasion that society >forced the individual to be unselfish. Note that I'm not equating >unselfishness and goodness; I purposefully chose Aztec human sacrifice >in order to make that point. It is my contention that people have a natural inclination to act selfishly just as they have a natural inclination to eat when they are hungry. Obviously either inclination can be resisted. The situation is complicated by the fact that people also have a natural inclination to conceal from others the extent to which they are acting selfishly. This often involves concealing from themselves the extent of their selfishness. (It is easier to tell a lie that you believe.) This makes it difficult for even well-intentioned people to resist the inclination to act selfishly. Consider double blind experiments. They were invented because even honest careful scientists cannot reliably resist the inclination to "fudge" results when subjective evaluations are involved. Why should we expect them to find it easier to resist the temptation to exaggerate the value of their work to society? It is not my contention that people are solely driven by self-interest, just that most people are influenced by self-interest making them unreliable judges in cases where their interests are at stake. Rich Pulchalsky continue (quoting me): >: Rich Puchalsky continued: >: >Now, if we can agree on those two points, what were you trying to say about >: >public policy response to climate change? > >: My original post was prompted by some comment of Tobis's >: along the general lines of "everybody means well". In the context >: of public policy regarding climate change this basically the >: opposite of the truth. People do not hire Washington lobbyists to >: unselfishly promote the interests of society as a whole. This >: should be recognized and discounted for. To take one example that >: Tobis refuses to acknowledge, climatologists do have a selfish >: interest in promoting concern about climate. > >Tobis started a post with a rhetorical claim that "everyone means well." >I don't think this is accurate, but a claim that "everyone doesn't mean >well" is just as inaccurate. Human behavior is messy and complex. >For instance, let's take your example of climatologists. Weighing against >any self-interest in promoting concern about climate is an individual >climatologist's desire to uphold scientific standards and to both >reveal and speak the truth, as well as to maintain his or her >individual reputation. Scientists in general beleive in this truth- >seeking ideal enough so that I would expect this to almost completely >outweigh self-interest in most cases. For those individuals who do >find self-interest to be a stronger motivator, you would expect them >to maximize their pay -- which they do by taking well-paying industry >jobs to deny any concern about climate. Therefore, while there are >some climatologists who "mean well" and others who "don't mean well", >they tend to self-segregate themselves so that those who don't mean well >are mainly on one side -- industry's. My contention would be everyone (or nearly everyone) is motivated to some extent by self-interest (in this context in the sense of putting their private interest before that of society as a whole). So everyone doesn't mean well to some extent. I think this is obviously true of Washington lobbyists who are, of course, generally paid to promote private interests. I agree human behavior is messy and complex. In particular much selfish behavior is not conscious. Scientists who take industry jobs generally do so because they cannot find satisfactory academic jobs (not because they are unusually greedy). For example the current Science magazine has an article about job prospects for recent physics PhDs ("Young Physicists Despair of Tenured Jobs", James Glanz, Science, 279 (February 20, 1998), p. 1128). 1438 new physics PhDs were awarded in 1995-1996 while (if I understand the figure correctly) these institutions (PhD producing) granted tenure to 33 physicists. Obviously these are not terrific odds. Note there is a third type of job, a government job. As for the ability of government climatologists to offer unbiased advice on matters connected with the government budget for climatology, I think the example of physicists is instructive. A large number of physicists in the post WWII era were employed by the US government to work on nuclear weapons and nuclear power. Do you seriously contend that the advice these physicists gave the government on such matters as: hydrogen bombs, neutron bombs, dangers of open air testing, verifiability of test bans, importance of testing, anti- missile missiles, X-ray lasers, military reactors, civilian reactors, nuclear waste etc. was uninfluenced by the institutional interests of the weapons labs? I think government climatology labs will have the same unbiased view of the global warming menace as the weapons labs had of the Red menace. Rich Puchalsky continued (quoting me): >: The question was is it likely that future generations will be >: wealthier than we are. I see little reason to believe that the costs >: to the US of coping with climate change would be significant compared >: to the economic growth that can be expected over the next hundred years. >: So any sacrifices we make to prevent climate change will probably be >: for the benefit of people wealthier than we are. This reduces any >: moral obligation on our part. > >But costs of climate change do not apply only to fututre First World >generations. It is not certain that future Third World generations >will be richer than current First Worlders. This is different equity issue which has nothing to do with generational equity. If you wish to help poor Third Worlders, there are plenty around today. Rich Puchalsky continued: >It is also not certain that any amount of money will be able to >recompense certain people. If flood waters were going to drown your >homeland, how much payment would you want? That's the kind of thing >that people have been known to sacrifice their lives for, and I'm >not sure that they would consider monetary recompense to be adequate, >especially since they are not likely to get any. Again what does this have to do with generational equity? As you pointed out to Tobis government commonly imposes things on individuals for the sake of society as a whole. Dams are built which flood land that families have farmed for many generations. Requiring consensus is a recipe for paralysis. Rich Puchalsky continued (quoting me): >: As for risk factors, I expect the biggest risk factor to the >: US is internal political strife. > >Puzzling. Do you live in the U.S.? People outside the U.S. often seem >to have an exaggerated idea of U.S. internal political strife. I have lived in the US all my life. I think I have a fairly obvious US-centric point of view which it is puzzling that you haven't noticed. I would not argue that the risk of internal strife for the US is particularly large absolutely or compared with other nations. However I don't think it is negligible over a hundred year period. There hangs in my mother's house a portrait of a young man (a distant relative of mine) who died in the civil war. What happened once could happen again. What do you believe the biggest risk factors are? I suppose I would consider the risk to the US from external enemies to be of the same order. After that it's hard to say. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Campaign Finance and Global Warming Un From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980302.174810.861@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Mon, 2 Mar 1998 22:48:10 GMT References: <19980227.194127.468@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6df7mj$5mn@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6df7mj$5mn@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 2 Mar 1998 21:18:11 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >I hope that the institutional inertia of the scientific establishment >can overcome a compulsion to repeat past successes. I think repeating past successes makes more sense than repeating past failures. Or in other words it is perfectly sensible to allocate more research dollars to areas currently making rapid progress. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Comon Don, tell us! From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.energy,sci.environment,sci.energy.hydrogen Message-ID: <19980415.161339.727@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 15 Apr 1998 20:13:39 GMT References: <352D81B7.E22F10FA@ibm.net><352E48B3.AE29237D@princeton.edu> <352EE697.B08FDA42@ibm.net><352F78A1.F8A9E6BF@princeton.edu> <01bd65e0$0a3706e0$7609ccc3@onar> <01bd666d$793189c0$8309ccc3@onar> <3531F3A2.741C7329@interaccess.com><01bd66d4$453a7200$8b09ccc3@onar> <01bd66f7$e6bad0c0$4f09ccc3@onar> <3534049B.F721557F@icsi.net> <6h1rnm$pe3$2@snipp.uninett.no> In article <6h1rnm$pe3$2@snipp.uninett.no>, on 15 Apr 1998 08:39:18 GMT, onar@hsr.no (Onar Aam) writes: >> The law of conservation of angular momentum would mean that the earth >>won't be slowed down by particles _in_ the system, because there is >>always an opposite but equal reaction every time there is a collision. > >I see your point. The thing I hadn't considered was that solar power also >propulses the latitudal winds as a result of the Coriolis effect. Immediately it >would seem to me that placing wind turbines in strategic places, such as at >the equator will generally cause a force opposing the rotation of the earth, >which should slow it down. But if this is counteracted by a distribution of >opposite forces elsewhere then there will of course be no slowing of the >earth. I believe you are (were?) wrong about wind power generation slowing the rotation of the earth. However the matter is not completely trivial since I believe tidal power generation could slow the rotation of the earth. I believe the key point (as mention by another poster) is the source of the energy. Winds are primarily driven by solar radiation which does not exert a torque on the earth. However tides are driven by gravitation forces which are exerting a torque (because they slightly deform the earth and then the earth's rotation carries the deformation out of the preferred position, this motion being resisted by the gravitational forces). I believe there are some tidal effects in the atmosphere (as well as the oceans), tapping these for power could slow the rotation of the earth. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980421.182601.973@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 21 Apr 1998 22:26:01 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <6hirv3$fou@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <6hivqm$sd3$1@clarknet.clark.net> In article <6hivqm$sd3$1@clarknet.clark.net>, on 21 Apr 1998 20:33:26 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >Michael Tobis (tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu) wrote: >: Of course Ms Seltzer's comments are precisely on the mark. > >: I wish McCarthy and Puchalsky would have validated her concerns >: before going on to beat their drums. > >"Validated her concerns"? Her stated concern was lack of objectivity >in public environmentalist writings. She showed no awareness of just >why this happens, and in fact confirmed by E-mail that she's never >tried to write about environmental issues publicly. Validating her >concerns might have been polite, but it's validating ignorance. > >It's very easy to get on a high horse and advise other people to >be more objective. In fact, as she would know if she had ever tried >to do the same things as the people she criticized, those who are >objective usually don't get heard. The media acts as a filtering >system that extracts extreme views and presents them to the public, >while suppressing boring and more careful information. Her concern was that much of what is written about the environment comes across as propaganda. This is not surprising because much of it is propaganda. Your claim that the media filters out moderate views is nonsense. In fact the mass media tends to filter out extreme views as can be seen by comparing with the unfiltered views found in usenet groups such as sci.environment or in fund raising letters. A more plausible reason for the abundance of crude propaganda is the constant need of interest groups such as Greenpeace to raise money. Apparently rabidly partisan appeals attract the maximum amounts from the faithful even if they tend to turn off the public at large. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Vitamin C LIghts Up Corporate Health From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980421.192934.460@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Tue, 21 Apr 1998 23:29:34 GMT Rich Puchalsky posted: >While this is somewhat amusing, I find it to be a serious breach of >corporate ethics as well. After all, the escaped mercury from those >bulbs is going to go on to harm real people. The fact that it will be >statistical harm rather than obvious acute harm doesn't change the >basic problem with this deceptive scheme. Ok, how much "statistical" harm will this do? I expect the harm is hypothetical, highly speculative and likely insignificant. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980422.211301.595@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 1998 01:13:01 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <19980421.182601.973@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6hjdae$qr9@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6hjdae$qr9@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 22 Apr 1998 00:23:42 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >That's a factor. But the main point is that the people who are paid to >communicate all have an ax to grind, and that the media are too lazy to >bother finding people who are not so motivated, and so incompetent that >most genuine experts do their level best to avoid getting in the newspapers >or even worse on TV. I primarily read the New York Times. I do not believe its reporters are lazy or incompetent. I see no reason to believe reporters in general are any lazier or less competent than say climatologists. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980422.212059.438@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 1998 01:20:59 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <6hirv3$fou@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <6hivqm$sd3$1@clarknet.clark.net> <19980421.182601.973@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com>#1/1 <6hjr1u$ft$1@nnrp1.dejanews.com> In article <6hjr1u$ft$1@nnrp1.dejanews.com>, on Tue, 21 Apr 1998 23:18:06 -0600, gg3@one.net.au writes: > jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: > >> Your claim that the media filters out moderate views is >> nonsense. In fact the mass media tends to filter out extreme views as >> can be seen by comparing with the unfiltered views found in usenet >> groups such as sci.environment or in fund raising letters. >> A more plausible reason for the abundance of crude propaganda >> is the constant need of interest groups such as Greenpeace to raise >> money. Apparently rabidly partisan appeals attract the maximum amounts >> from the faithful even if they tend to turn off the public at large. >> James B. Shearer >> > >I note that you're keen to single out environmentalist propaganda, have no >interest in commercial-interest propaganda (where the real money to buy public >opinion is spent). The original poster was primarily concerned with the strident tone of much environmentalist literature. I offered an explanation. Actually upon reflection this strident tone is also due to the commercial interests of the plaintiff's bar. Of course much anti-environmentalist advocacy is also funded by commercial interests. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Vitamin C LIghts Up Corporate Health From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980422.214949.006@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 1998 01:49:49 GMT References: <19980421.192934.460@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6hkpjh$9i1$1@clarknet.clark.net> In article <6hkpjh$9i1$1@clarknet.clark.net>, on 22 Apr 1998 12:59:29 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: Rich Puchalsky posted: >: >While this is somewhat amusing, I find it to be a serious breach of >: >corporate ethics as well. After all, the escaped mercury from those >: >bulbs is going to go on to harm real people. The fact that it will be >: >statistical harm rather than obvious acute harm doesn't change the >: >basic problem with this deceptive scheme. > >: Ok, how much "statistical" harm will this do? I expect the >: harm is hypothetical, highly speculative and likely insignificant. >: James B. Shearer > >Since Shearer has such a strong expectation, I think I'll let him defend >it with his own risk calculation. I don't do work like that unless >someone is paying me. Surely Shearer has some facts to back up this >expectation of his. My expectation is based on my belief that any calculation of the harm done by the mercury will involve so much uncertainty concerning exposure pathways and the effects of low levels of mercury on people that any calculated harm will be highly speculative. Note your claim is unhedged ("is going to" rather than "may"). Furthermore I expect the allowed levels were set in the first place based on pessimistic assumptions so that it is likely there is a margin of safety before violations begin to cause significant harm. Rich Puchalsky continued: >As part of his analysis, Shearer might want to explain how soluable >mercury from light bulbs differs significantly from soluable mercury >from any other source. Assuming that no chemical or physical difference >is found, he might want to go on to explain why, as a public policy >matter, soluable mercury should be controlled in some objects entering >municipal dumps and not others. What does this have to do with the issue at hand? I can support anti drunken driving laws without arguing that every drunk driver harms somebody. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980422.230407.939@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 1998 03:04:07 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <19980421.182601.973@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6hjdae$qr9@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <6hkqcp$9i1$2@clarknet.clark.net> In article <6hkqcp$9i1$2@clarknet.clark.net>, on 22 Apr 1998 13:12:57 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >Michael Tobis (tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu) wrote: >: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: : Your claim that the media filters out moderate views is >: : nonsense. In fact the mass media tends to filter out extreme views as >: : can be seen by comparing with the unfiltered views found in usenet >: : groups such as sci.environment or in fund raising letters. > >: While it's true that the views in usenet tend to be more extreme than those >: in the media, they typically reflect views in the media. The number of > >More to the point, it's not much of a claim to say that the media >filters out extreme views and then use Usenet as an example! The media >will (usually) filter out obvious cranks, but that's not saying that much >for it. > >As for fund raising letters, I'll deal with that in a future post. The point I was making is that it is unconvincing to claim environmentalists express themselves in strident ways because other- wise the media will ignore them when the same stridency (or worse) is seen in unfiltered areas such as usenet or direct mail appeals. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980423.110512.600@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 1998 15:05:12 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <19980421.182601.973@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6hjdae$qr9@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <6hkqcp$9i1$2@clarknet.clark.net> In article <6hkqcp$9i1$2@clarknet.clark.net>, on 22 Apr 1998 13:12:57 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >More to the point, it's not much of a claim to say that the media >filters out extreme views and then use Usenet as an example! The media >will (usually) filter out obvious cranks, but that's not saying that much >for it. So Puchalsky claims the media doesn't filter out extreme views, it just filters out cranks. This is rather hard to argue with as any sufficiently extreme view can be depicted as crank. I will just note this definition of crank is time dependent as the media tracks general changes in popular opinion. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980423.112213.210@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 1998 15:22:13 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <19980422.211301.595@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6hm9ho$ri8@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6hm9ho$ri8@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 23 Apr 1998 02:37:44 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >If everyone got their news from the New York Times I wouldn't have >much of a problem. Your mistake is believing that the Times is >a representative sample. I believe the New York Times is widely available (at least my brother is able to get it in San Diego). So most people could get their news from the New York Times. I don't think you can force people to get news from sources you approve of. Also while I do not think the Times is a typical newspaper, I don't think it is completely unique either. It has been a while since I read the Los Angeles Times but I recall it as reasonable. There are other newspapers with good reputations. Even the local Gannet Westchester paper is not all that bad. Furthermore I do not believe the Times has a monopoly on hard working and competent journalists. I particularly doubt there is any great supply of lazy journalists working anywhere. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980423.195638.463@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 23 Apr 1998 23:56:38 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <19980421.182601.973@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6hjdae$qr9@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <6hkqcp$9i1$2@clarknet.clark.net> <6hl4rq$20b@spool.cs.wisc.edu> <6hlneu$h8a$1@clarknet.clark.net> <6hm55t$g6i$1@clarknet.clark.net> <6hmaju$ri8@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6hmaju$ri8@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 23 Apr 1998 02:55:58 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >It is intrinsically very difficult for an advocacy group to be objective. >I'm not sure I can think of an instance of an advocacy group admitting to >a major substantive mistake. Can anyone provide one? Well, Consumer's Union recently admitted botching a pet food study. Some time ago, William Buckley admitted his campaign to free a convicted murderer was a mistake. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Vitamin C LIghts Up Corporate Health From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980423.200433.848@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 24 Apr 1998 00:04:33 GMT References: <19980421.192934.460@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <19980422.214949.006@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6hnkqc$dka$1@clarknet.clark.net> In article <6hnkqc$dka$1@clarknet.clark.net>, on 23 Apr 1998 14:56:12 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >The science around mercury toxicity is much more solid than most forms >of harm from chronic toxic exposure. Plus there are proven pathways >from dumps to water to fish to fish consumption, among others. I find >your objection to be based on personal incredulity and with nothing to >support it. Naturally, I believe my unsupported opinion is as valid as Puchalsky's. Rich Puchalsky also posted: >I said statistical harm. Every drunk driver does indeed cause statistical >harm, just as every discarded mercury-containing light bulb causes >statistical harm. It is inevitable that some drunk drivers will harm >people, just as it is inevitable that the mercury from some discarded >light bulbs will harm people. In that sense every drunk driver does indeed >harm somebody, since it's not possible to predict beforehand which ones >will actually be involved in an accident. Puchalsky is abusing the language. A drunk driver who makes it home without encountering anyone has done no harm statistical or otherwise. A driver who sets out drunk is putting others at risk. He may or may not actually harm them. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980423.201743.186@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 24 Apr 1998 00:17:43 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <19980423.112213.210@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6hocgo$2qd@spool.cs.wisc.edu> In article <6hocgo$2qd@spool.cs.wisc.edu>, on 23 Apr 1998 21:40:40 GMT, tobis@scram.ssec.wisc.edu (Michael Tobis) writes: >If you don't understand that journalists are lazy, you can't understand >why there is such a profession as "publicist". The vast majority of >US journalism amounts to recycled press releases from advocacy groups. >The "hard-hitting" "researched" stories quote from competing advocacy >groups while "puff pieces" quote from only one side. That's the entire >repertory, as far the eye can see. This is completely unfair to journalists. Journalists do not use the time saved by relying on advocacy groups lazing around the newsroom, they go to the next story. Journalists are expected to produce a large volume of material and they have deadlines. Attributing the resulting imperfections in their output to laziness is ridiculous. I suppose you believe the food at MacDonalds is less than perfect because the workers are lazy and incompetent. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: objectivity concerning environmental issues From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980424.120752.597@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 24 Apr 1998 16:07:52 GMT References: <1998042013272100.JAA10013@ladder03.news.aol.com> <19980422.230407.939@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6honpo$r99$2@clarknet.clark.net> In article <6honpo$r99$2@clarknet.clark.net>, on 24 Apr 1998 00:53:12 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: The point I was making is that it is unconvincing to claim >: environmentalists express themselves in strident ways because other- >: wise the media will ignore them when the same stridency (or worse) >: is seen in unfiltered areas such as usenet or direct mail appeals. > >Shearer is ignoring selection effects again. Environmentalists are a >varied group, and you notice the strident ones on Usenet far more than >the non-strident ones. You can't say that environmentalists as a group >are strident because there are three people on Usenet who you dislike. This is a different argument. Your original post suggested environmentalists reluctantly express themselves stridently to avoid being filtered out by the media. Your new argument is that some environmentalists are naturally reasonable while others are naturally obnoxious, but that the obnoxious ones are more memorable. There is certainly something do this, people have a tendency to selectively perceive things according to a existing framework of beliefs. So people inclined to be skeptical about the environmental movement will tend to view it in terms of its least impressive advocates as this confirms their skepticism. Conversely I would expect people inclined to favor the environmental movement to view it terms of its most impressive advocates. James B. Shearer ========================================================================= Path: yktvmv!jbs Subject: Re: Vitamin C LIghts Up Corporate Health From: jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com Organization: IBM Newsgroups: sci.environment Message-ID: <19980424.193258.102@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> Date: Fri, 24 Apr 1998 23:32:58 GMT References: <19980421.192934.460@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <19980423.200433.848@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com> <6honkm$r99$1@clarknet.clark.net> In article <6honkm$r99$1@clarknet.clark.net>, on 24 Apr 1998 00:50:30 GMT, richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >jbs@yktvmv.watson.ibm.com wrote: >: In article <6hnkqc$dka$1@clarknet.clark.net>, >: on 23 Apr 1998 14:56:12 GMT, >: richp@mnsinc.com (Rich Puchalsky) writes: >: >The science around mercury toxicity is much more solid than most forms >: >of harm from chronic toxic exposure. Plus there are proven pathways >: >from dumps to water to fish to fish consumption, among others. I find >: >your objection to be based on personal incredulity and with nothing to >: >support it. > >: Naturally, I believe my unsupported opinion is as valid as >: Puchalsky's. > >Shearer is of course wrong, since he obviously doesn't know much about this >field. As is shown by his non-answer above. One could as well say Puchalsky obviously doesn't know much about the field as shown by his disinclination to support his original claim. In effect both of us have made predictions about what a careful analysis (which neither of us seems inclined to perform) would show. To sum up I predict such an analysis would show: 1. Based on present knowledge there is wide range of possibilities for the harm that will be caused by GE's actions. 2. It is likely that actual harm will turn out to be insignificant. Puchalsky predicts such an analysis would show: 1. It is certain (or virtually certain) harm will result. Note these predictions may not be contradictory if Puchalsky's includes insignificant harm (and taking into account our likely different thresholds for significant harm). >: Rich Puchalsky also posted: >: >I said statistical harm. Every drunk driver does indeed cause statistical >: >harm, just as every discarded mercury-containing light bulb causes >: >statistical harm. It is inevitable that some drunk drivers will harm >: >people, just as it is inevitable that the mercury from some discarded >: >light bulbs will harm people. In that sense every drunk driver does indeed >: >harm somebody, since it's not possible to predict beforehand which ones >: >will actually be involved in an accident. > >: Puchalsky is abusing the language. A drunk driver who makes >: it home without encountering anyone has done no harm statistical or >: otherwise. A driver who sets out drunk is putting others at risk. He >: may or may not actually harm them. > >Nonsense. A drunk person who sets out to drive is doing statistical harm >in that their decision will kill a fractional person. A company that >makes light bulbs with soluable mercury in them will by its corporate >decision kill statistical people. > >Statisitical harm is risk multipied by many instances of risk-generating >behavior. You were the one who brought up individual drunk drivers, not >me. The analogy only makes sense if you consider drunk drivers as a group. I brought up the analogy to explain that I could favor regulating behavior that is not certain (or even likely) to cause harm. My objection to your use of "statistical" is that it is wrong to talk about statistical values in cases where it is inappropriate to use statistical methods. For example when you do not have a large number of events (single drunk driver) or when the dominant source of uncertainty in the result is not statistical in nature (mercury in my opinion). For example if you know the risk of death is one in a million and you know 100 million people will be (independently) exposed to the risk then you can talk about 100 statistical deaths even if it is impossible to identify (even after the fact) the actual victims. This does not mean that the actual number of victims is exactly 100 but it is possible to compute the chance that the actual number of victims is between say 90 and 110 using standard statistical methods. In this example the chance that the actual number of deaths is 0 is very low so