Cited references and notes

1. A. R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, G. P. Putnam, New York (1994).
2. M. Minsky, The Emotion Machine, Pantheon, New York, forthcoming.
3. N. Frijda and J. Swagerman,“Can Computers Feel? Theory and Design of an Emotional System,” Cognition & Emotion 1, No. 3, 235–257 (1987).
4. H. A. Simon,“Motivational and Emotional Controls of Cognition,” Psychological Review 74, 29–39 (1967).
5. A. Sloman and M. Croucher,“Why Robots Will Have Emotions,” Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (1981).
6. Originally presented at the IBM Autonomic Computing Summit at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center, May 14–15, 2002.
7. D. A. Norman, A. Ortony, and W. Revelle,“Effective Functioning: A Three Level Model of Affect, Behavior, and Cognition,” in Who Needs Emotions? The Brain Meets the Machine, J. M. Fellous and M. A. Arbib, Editors, to be published.
8. There is beginning to emerge a substantial body of literature^9–12 on “affective computing,” systems designed to recognize or simulate human affect. Much of this work, however, does not deal with the design of machine architectures. Our own views have been particularly influenced by work that does, particularly that of Aaron Sloman.^11,13 In common with Sloman, we propose that human information processing operates at three levels. Our three levels, the Reaction, the Routine, and the Reflection levels are related to, but somewhat different from those of Sloman (see Reference 13). In particular, whereas his reactive level is essentially the same as our Reaction level, his “deliberative reasoning” is related to but different from our “Routine” level, and his “meta-management” level is similarly related to but somewhat different from our Reflection level. Other differences are not relevant to this discussion.
9. C. Breazeal, Designing Sociable Robots, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2002).
10. R. W. Picard, Affective Computing, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1997).
11. A. Sloman and B. Logan,“Evolvable Architectures for Human-Like Minds,” Affective Minds, G. Hatano, N. Okada, and H. Tanabe, Editors, Elsevier, Amsterdam (2000), pp. 169–181.
12. R. Trappl, P. Petta, and S. Payr, Emotions in Humans and Artifacts, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2003).
13. A. Sloman,“How Many Separately Evolved Emotional Beasties Live within Us?,” Emotions in Humans and Artifacts, R. Trappl, P. Petta, and S. Payr, Editors, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (2003).
14. R. E. Thayer, The Biopsychology of Mood and Arousal, Oxford University Press, New York (1991).
15. J. T. Cacioppo and W. L. Gardner,“Emotion,” Annual Review of Psychology 50, 191–214 (1999).
16. F. G. Ashby, A. M. Isen, and A. U. Turken,“A Neuropsychological Theory of Positive Affect and Its Influence on Cognition,” Psychological Review 106, No. 3, 529–550 (1999).
17. A. M. Isen,“Positive Affect and Decision Making,” Handbook of Emotions, M. Lewis and J. M. Haviland, Editors, Guilford, New York (1993), pp. 261–277.
18. D. A. Norman and T. Shallice,“Attention to Action: Willed and Automatic Control of Behavior,” Consciousness and Self Regulation: Advances in Research, vol. IV, R. J. Davidson, G. E. Schwartz, and D. Shapiro, Editors, Plenum Press, New York (1986).
19. Our use of “reflection” is related to the sense intended in computational reflection, whether in programming languages or operating systems. Both uses emphasize the capability of a system to examine its own operations, but the details and goals differ.
20. A. Brown and D. A. Patterson,“To Err Is Human,” Proceedings of the First Workshop on Evaluating and Architecting System Dependability (EASY'01), Göteborg, Sweden (July 2001).
21. D. A. Norman,“The `Problem' of Automation: Inappropriate Feedback and Interaction, Not `Over-Automation,'” Human Factors in Hazardous Situations, D. E. Broadbent, A. Baddeley, and J. T. Reason, Editors, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1990), pp. 585–593.